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Assessing the Silica (Frac) Sand Mining
Environmental Regulatory Frameworks
in Minnesota and Wisconsin: Who Has a
Better Plan for Digging, the Gophers or
Badgers? 1
William Miley2

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been significant growth of silica
sand mining in the United States due to increased demand for the
sand in the hydraulic fracturing (or “fracking”) oil and gas
extraction industry.3 Minnesota and Wisconsin are home to
abundant deposits of the specific type of silica sand that is needed
in the fracking process, yet these silica “frac” sand4 resources are
not found widely elsewhere in the country—resulting in a localized
and highly profitable mining boom in the upper Midwest.5
1

Minnesota and Wisconsin are often referred to as the “gopher state” and
“badger state,” respectively, in honor of each state’s population of prolific
burrowing mammals.
2
Juris Doctorate Expected May 2015, Hamline University School of Law. I
thank my wife Beth for her endearing support in all that I do.
3
See, e.g., Paul Tosto, MPR News Primer: Frac Sand Mining, MINN. PUB.
RADIO NEWS, http://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/03/08/frac-sand-mining-mprnews-primer (Feb. 15, 2013).
4
Although commonly, and often pejoratively, referred to as “frac sand,” this
article will use the more diplomatic and scientific term “silica sand.” Frac sand is
a specific type of silica sand, and most of the health and environmental issues
associated with silica “frac” sand mining operations are of equal concern for all
types of silica sand mining. See generally Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, WIS.
DEP’T OF NAT. RES., at 12-32 (Jan. 2012), http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/\Mines/
documents/SilicaSandMiningFinal.pdf (discussing the broad range of potential
environmental impacts associated with sand mining).
5
See Tosto, supra note 3. As of May 2013, there were seventeen active silica
sand mines in Minnesota, with an additional twenty-one mines being planned.
Mapped: More than 20 proposed frac sand facilities, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS
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However, silica sand mining has become a controversial issue in the
region, with supporters touting economic benefits of industry
expansion, while local communities are concerned about potential
health and environmental impacts associated with the mining.6
Minnesota and Wisconsin state agencies, as well as some
local governmental units (LGUs) within each state, have long
regulated sand mining operations. But the accelerated development
of sand mining sites, the rush of associated economic activity, and
uncertainty about the potential environmental risks of silica sand
has generated debate about the proper roles for state and local
regulators.7 Concerns over regulation include determining whether
the state or local governments are best suited to oversee mining
activities; whether sufficient regulatory controls are in place to
manage the risks of silica sand mining; and whether mining
operations are being regulated proportionate to the risks, so as to
not impede beneficial economic development. This debate has
spurred recent state and local regulatory activity in Minnesota and
Wisconsin to address the concerns of the various silica sand
stakeholders—mine developers, state agencies, LGUs, and the
public.8
This article sets out to analyze the silica sand mining
environmental regulatory schemes in Minnesota and Wisconsin to
determine if this booming industry is met with an appropriate statelocal oversight framework. Part II of this article provides a brief
explanation of silica sand mining, including a discussion of the
potential health and environmental risks and economic benefits and

(May 1, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/frac_sand/frac_map/.
In Wisconsin, silica sand mining and processing operations doubled from 2011 to
2012. In May 2013, there were 112 permitted and nineteen proposed silica sand
facilities, including mining, processing, and rail loading sites. Map: Wisconsin’s
Frac Sand Industry, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG, http://www.wisconsinwatch.org/
viz/fracmap/ (May 1, 2013).
6
See Tosto, supra note 3.
7
See, e.g., Tony Kennedy, Southeastern Minnesota Asks State for Frac Sand
Help, STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:27 AM), http://www.startribune.com/
local/191942801.html.
8
See infra Part IV.
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concerns associated with silica sand. Part III provides an analysis of
environmental regulatory theories as applied to silica sand mining,
with a focus on the state-local regulator dynamic, to determine the
best regulatory approach for silica sand mining in Minnesota and
Wisconsin. Part IV assesses the current state-local environmental
regulatory frameworks in Minnesota and Wisconsin to identify
aspects that are likely to be effective, as well as opportunities for
improvement and approaches that may be imprudent. In Part V, this
article concludes by highlighting the aspects of Minnesota and
Wisconsin’s regulatory frameworks that are indicative of an
effective state-local adaptive oversight approach for silica sand
mining. However, the recent legislative trends in each state indicate
that Minnesota is on a better path to properly manage the risks and
benefits of silica sand mining for all stakeholders, whereas
Wisconsin may be evolving towards a state primacy regulatory
framework that could result in negative consequences for public
health and the environment.

II. DIGGING FOR SAND: WHAT’S THE BIG
DEAL?
Silica sand mining, and its connection to oil and gas
fracking, involve fairly technical industry processes, substantial
health and environmental risks, and significant economic
implications. These various aspects intertwine to create a number of
important and complex public policy issues associated with
environmental regulation of silica sand mining. Therefore, in order
to assess the efficacy of the silica sand mining environmental
oversight frameworks in Minnesota and Wisconsin, it is important
to first understand how silica sand mining and its associated risks
and implications operate. The following sections provide
background information on silica sand mining operations, the
associated environmental concerns, and the potential economic
effects of the mining industry.
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A. Silica (Frac) Sand and the Mining Process
Silica sand, which is composed of the mineral quartz, has
historically been mined throughout the country for a variety of
commercial and industrial uses, such as glass-making and waterfiltration.9 But recently, a certain quality of silica sand is in very
high demand for a new purpose, as it is a required ingredient in
fracking10—the controversial oil and gas extraction method
sweeping the nation.11 In fact, many of the environmental,
9

See Silica Sand FAQs, MINN. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/lands_minerals/silicasand/faq.html.
10
Fracking is an enhanced extraction technique used to access oil and gas
resources (hydrocarbons) that are locked in geologic formations with very low
permeability, such as shale, from which hydrocarbons cannot be extracted
through conventional methods. Fracking involves drilling a well vertically and
horizontally into the hydrocarbon-containing bedrock located thousands of feet
beneath the ground surface. Then fracking fluid containing water, chemicals, and
silica sand is pumped into the bedrock at very high pressures to create, expand,
and prop open fractures, releasing the trapped hydrocarbons. See Energy
Resources Program: Hydraulic Fracturing Research, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/HydraulicFracturing.aspx#
3892235-overview (last visited Jan. 15, 2014)..
11
The widespread expansion of fracking throughout the U.S. is a hotly debated
issue due to the potential significant advantages for national energy and economic
development versus the high risks to health and environment surrounding the
drilling sites. See John Ydstie, Will Renewables Suffer Because Of U.S. Oil and
Gas Boom, NPR (Dec. 27, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/27/
257654578/will-renewables-suffer-because-of-u-s-oil-and-gas-boom.
The
potential benefits of expanding oil and gas development include nation-wide
economic and jobs growth and increased U.S. energy independence promoting
economic stability and national security. See Jim Efstathiou, Fracking Boom Seen
Raising Household Incomes by $1,200, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-04/fracking-boom-seen-raisinghousehold-incomes-by-1-200.html. Some also argue that a large-scale transition
from coal- to cleaner natural gas-fired energy production is an important step in
reducing carbon emissions in the effort to combat climate change. Id. The
environmental and health risks associated with fracking include impacts to
surface and groundwater, air quality, and effects on seismic activity. See Natural
Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 14,
2014), http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing. In addition, some argue that
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economic, and regulatory issues associated with silica sand mining
and fracking are quite analogous, with support for silica sand
mining coming directly from the fracking industry and an aspect of
the opposition to silica sand mining stemming from its very
connection to fracking.12
Silica sand is used as a “proppant” during oil and gas well
fracking activities; the sand is needed to prop open fractures created
in low-permeability bedrock to facilitate petroleum resource
extraction.13 The silica sand that is used as a fracking proppant must
meet specific industry standards with respect to the sand
composition, shape, size, and compressive strength in order to
withstand the extremely high-pressure conditions present beneath
thousands of feet of bedrock.14 Although Minnesota and Wisconsin
do not have significant petroleum resources to be fracked, they are
among the few places in the country that have just the right type of

expansion of oil and gas drilling will result in continued primary use of climate
change-inducing fossil fuels over expeditious development of renewable energy
technology. See Ydstie, supra note 11.
12
To be clear, although the silica sand mining and hydrocarbon fracking
industries are related due to the use of silica sand in hydrocarbon fracking
operations, sand mining and hydrocarbon fracking are two distinct processes and
industries that occur in different locations, have different environmental impacts,
and are regulated under different schemes. This article assesses environmental
regulation of silica sand mining, not hydrocarbon fracking. A brief discussion of
the fracking process and national debate regarding the risks and benefits of
fracking is included in this article to provide the larger context regarding the
forces that are driving the silica sand industry and regulatory debate. For indepth analyses of fracking environmental regulation, see Emily C. Powers,
Fracking and Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach That Avoids the
Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 913 (2011); Robert H.
Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State and Federal
Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation, 44 URB.
LAW. 533 (2012); John R. Nolon & Victoria Polidoro, Hydrofracking:
Disturbances Both Geological and Political: Who Decides?, 44 URB. LAW. 507
(2012).
13
Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 3.
14
Id.
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high-quality and accessible silica sand formations that are sought by
the fracking industry.15
The silica sand deposits that are targeted for the most costeffective mining are generally located at relatively shallow depths
(within fifty feet below the ground surface), therefore the typical
technique to remove the silica sand is strip-mining from large pits
that are open at the ground surface.16 Explosive blasting in the mine
pit followed by material crushing are both typically performed to
remove and break up heavily-cemented sand deposits.17 The sand is
usually processed at the mine site or at an off-site plant by washing
and screening to remove unwanted grain sizes.18 In some cases the
sand is further prepared by coating it with resin to enhance
performance in the fracking process.19 Chemical additives such as
polyacrylamide, which can breakdown into a toxic pollutant, are
usually used during sand processing to aid in separating grain
sizes.20 The sand is then transported off-site by open- and closedtopped trucks and railroad cars.21 After sand mining is finished at a
site, state and local regulators typically require reclamation of the
mine site to establish safe and usable terrain for an approved postmining use.22
B. The Health and Environmental Risks
There are various potential impacts to health and the
environment associated with silica sand mining, processing, and
transportation activities. There are potential impacts to air quality
15

See Tosto, supra note 3.
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 7.
17
Id. at 7-9.
18
Id. at 9.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 22-23.
21
Id. at 10.
22
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 10-11. Mine site
reclamation activities generally include grading slopes, adding topsoil, and
planting vegetation. Former mine sites are reclaimed for uses including wildlife
habitat, agricultural land, or building sites.
16
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due to fugitive silica dust (respirable crystalline silica [RCS]) and
other particulate matter that is generated throughout the mining
activities; the RCS becomes airborne and escapes mining and
processing sites or vehicles during transport.23 RCS is an air
pollutant of high concern, because there are known health risks
associated with exposure to high concentrations of RCS in
occupational settings.24 However, there is little known about the
level of RCS concentrations and the associated air quality health
risks to communities that are adjacent to silica sand mining sites
and transportation routes.25 Therefore, communities in close
proximity to silica sand mining operations are particularly
concerned about the potential health impacts of RCS.26 In addition
to RCS, various hazardous air pollutants are also emitted from the
heavy equipment used to mine, transport, and process the silica
sand.27
There are several potential impacts to water resources
associated with silica sand mining. Water is used often during the
mining and processing activities to wash fine particles out of the
silica sand.28 This process water, in addition to accumulated
stormwater, is held on-site and discharged off-site.29 There is
potential for sediment-laden or contaminated water generated at the
mining or processing site to impact groundwater or surface waters
23

Id. at 12.
See Silica (crystalline, respirable) Chronic Toxic Summary, CAL. OFFICE OF
ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT (Feb. 2005), http://www.oehha.org/air/
chronic_rels/pdf/silicacrel_final.pdf (citing numerous studies indicating that RCS
exposure causes silicosis and other serious chronic diseases to miners and other
industrial occupations).
25
See Silica Sand Mining, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Nov. 26,
2013),
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/air/air-quality-and-pollutants/airpollutants/silica-sand-mining/index.html [hereinafter MPCA Silica Sand Mining].
26
See, e.g., Silica Sand Dust, CONCERNED CHIPPEWA CITIZENS, http://cccwis.com/page8/page8.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (community action
brochure discussing the health concerns of silica sand dust associated with
mining activities in the Chippewa Valley region of Wisconsin).
27
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 12.
28
Id. at 21.
29
Id.
24
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such as streams and wetlands.30 Further, groundwater is sometimes
encountered during mining activities and pumped from the mine pit
to facilitate removal of the silica sand, which can potentially cause
groundwater and surface water depletion problems in the area.31
Sand mine development involves removal and disturbance
of surface soil at the site, which can damage future soil viability at
the mining site, resulting in unproductive and unhealthy land for
agricultural or other post-mining uses.32 When the mining
operations end, mine sites are usually required to be reclaimed to
remediate damage to the soil and land; however, there is concern
that current mine reclamation programs do not properly restore soil
health at former mine sites.33 In addition, if a mine site is not
reclaimed properly to prevent erosion, open pits, or unstable slopes,
the former mine area can be hazardous to people who enter the site
and also be prone to refuse and hazardous material dumping.34
There are also aesthetic and nuisance-type impacts
associated with silica sand mining operations that can burden
nearby residents and users of recreational land adjacent to mining
operations.35 Ongoing noise and light emanate from mine sites that
operate long hours, disturbing people and wildlife in proximity to
the site.36 Scenic bluffs and other landscape features could be

30

Id.
Id. at 22.
32
See Richard Kremer, UW, Chippewa County Will Investigate How Frac Sand
Mining Affects Soil, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 5, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.
wpr.org/uw-chippewa-county-will-investigate-how-frac-sand-mining-affects-soil.
33
Id. (indicating that Wisconsin university and county personnel are studying
how sand mining activities affects soil health, because little is known about the
extent of soil damage and repair outcomes associated with sand mining and site
reclamation activities).
34
See Alison Dirr, With Frac Sand Boom in Full Swing, Study to Guide Mine
Reclamation, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.
wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/05/with-frac-sand-boom-in-full-swing-study-toguide-mine-reclamation/.
35
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 30-33.
36
Id.
31
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destroyed by mining activities.37 Additionally, there is often an
increase in heavy vehicle traffic coming and going from mine sites
that can create nuisance and safety issues.38
C. The Economic Potential
The economic impact of new silica sand mining operations
on the surrounding communities and the state is also a controversial
issue, but no doubt there is the potential for substantial financial
gains associated with the mining expansion. Private property
owners who sit atop silica sand deposits can obtain large payments
for selling the mining rights, while the sand mining companies
stand to make millions from selling the sand when in high demand
by the fracking industry.39 But more significantly, mining
supporters point to the widespread and long-term economic benefits
of growing the silica sand industry. They maintain that silica sand
mining will create many new high-paying jobs and boost the local
economy in rural areas where the mining is typically performed and
where economic stimulus is especially needed.40 Supporters further
declare that silica sand mining is projected to be sustainable for
years as fracking expansion continues throughout the county.41
Additionally, supporters state that the sand resources are unique to
the region, so the industry cannot be moved out of state.42
However, others warn that the proposed long-term economic
benefits of mining have not been born out historically across the
37

See Altering Landscapes - Frac-sand mining removes our bluffs, HOUSTON
CNTY. PROTECTORS, http://www.sandpointtimes.com/environment/landscape.asp
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
38
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 30.
39
See Mike Ivey, Wisconsin at 'Global Epicenter' of Frac Sand Mining Industry,
THE CAP TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013, 8:55 AM), http://host.madison.com/news/
local/writers/mike_ivey/wisconsin-at-global-epicenter-of-frac-sand-miningindustry/article_45690930-3125-11e3-ba86-0019bb2963f4.html#ixzz2qfpz4Kto
(reporting that silica sand mining is a $1 billion dollar industry in Wisconsin
primarily driven by demand from the fracking industry).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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country, and increased mining operations can actually do more
harm than good regarding the economic prosperity of local
communities and the state. Mining economies tend to be unstable
and undergo boom and bust cycles, which can have significant
negative impacts on small and rural communities.43 In fact, the
demand for silica sand from Minnesota and Wisconsin has already
undergone a cycle of waning after the initial substantial growth,
halting mining activities and leaving those involved in the industry
with economic uncertainty.44 Property values tend to depress in
counties that contain mining sites, with decreased property values
especially common in areas adjacent to mine sites and haul routes.45
One economic study prepared for Wisconsin town and agricultural
associations, indicates that job creation associated with expanded
silica sand mining in west-central Wisconsin is expected to be
modest, representing only a fraction of one percent of the total
employment in the region.46

43

See generally The Economics of Frac Sand Mining, UNIV. OF WIS. COOP.
EXTENSION,http://conservationvoters.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
uwex_flyer_on_frac_sand_property_values.pdf?c5398br (last visited Feb. 17,
2014). The growth and recession of the mining industry is largely driven by
commodity prices, which can fluctuate rapidly and unpredictably. Labor
migration is often connected with volatile industries such as mining, resulting in
population growth and decreases that mirror the ups and downs in demand for
mined commodities. Rural communities can become dependent on the local
mining industry and without a well-diversified economy they are particularly at
risk of high local unemployment and decreases in the tax base when mining
activities slow.
44
See Kate Prengaman, Mining Firms Stockpiling Frac Sand Until Price Goes
Up, LACROSSE TRIBUNE (Dec. 22, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://lacrossetribune.com/
news/local/mining-firms-stockpiling-frac-sand-until-price-goesup/article_0aaa7294-4c00-11e2-8efb-001a4bcf887a.html; see also Elizabeth
Baier, Slowing Demand for Frac Sand Changes the Landscape in Southeast
Minnesota, MINN. PUB. RADIONEWS (Nov. 10, 2013, 7:20 AM),http://www.
mprnews.org/story/2013/11/11/environment/frac-sand-mine-saratoga.
45
See The Economics of Frac Sand Mining, supra note 43, at 1.
46
Thomas M. Power & Donovan S. Power, The Economic Benefits and Costs of
Frac-Sand Mining in West Central Wisconsin, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y,
at 5 (May 2013), http://www.iatp.org/files/2013_05_30_FracSandMining_f.pdf.
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III. ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY THEORIES: WHAT IS THE BEST
APPROACH FOR SILICA SAND MINING IN
MINNESOTA AND WISCONSIN?
Since the rise of modern environmental regulation, legal
scholars have debated what regulatory schemes are best suited to
appropriately manage the environmental risks associated with
various industries, while also being careful not to unnecessarily
stifle economic growth and productivity. The debate has often
focused on theories of economic efficiency as a basis for achieving
the ideal environmental regulatory balance.47 Economic efficiency
theories dictate that environmental regulation should be only as
stringent and costly as necessary to prevent environmental impacts
for which remedial costs are not greater than the economic losses
resulting from over-regulation.48
One such economic efficiency theory is the “matching
principle,” which seeks to identify the best match between a level of
government—federal, state, or local—and the nature and
geographic extent of the environmental risks.49 The matching
principle holds that interaction between an industry and primarily
one regulating body (or a sole regulator in a strict matching
approach), rather than overlapping regulatory layers, is preferred for
some industries because it would result in higher economic
47

See Powers, supra note 12, at 934.
Id. at 915-16, 932 (discussing a basis for economic efficiency theories-regulation is reciprocal: “[b]enefits to industry in the form of less regulation can
be correlated with costs of protecting public health and the environment from
harm or increased risk of harm. Thus, the operative inquiry for policymakers
concerns who should bear the cost of regulation, which can be discussed in terms
of efficiency or may require reaching normative conclusions about who ought to
bear the burdens environmental harms present. The idea that harms are reciprocal
is the building block of arguments that posit that regulation becomes inefficient
when it is overly cautious and leads to unnecessary costs, as in the form of lost
jobs.”).
49
Id. at 935.
48
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efficiency for all players.50 The matching principle is usually
applied to questions of environmental federalism;51 but, the federalstate dynamic is not at issue while assessing regulatory approaches
to silica sand mining, as the industry primarily involves
environmental risks of state and local scale. However, the matching
theory could be applied as a regulatory approach to silica sand
mining, because in most circumstances state or local regulation,
rather than federal, is deemed most appropriate due to the specific
geographic nature of environmental problems.52 Thus, it is
worthwhile to apply the matching principle to the state-local
regulatory dynamic at the heart of silica sand mining in Minnesota
and Wisconsin, to explore if the state or LGUs alone would be the
most efficient and effective silica sand regulator.
To begin, it seems clear that LGUs would not be best suited
under a strict matching approach as the sole regulators of silica sand
mining. Minnesota and Wisconsin currently regulate industrial
impacts to land, air, and water through state-wide regulatory
schemes that implement at least base-level standards required by
federal law, as do most states.53 So, transition of all power to LGUs
to regulate silica sand mining environmental impacts would be a
dramatic upheaval of established state-led frameworks. In addition,
numerous independent LGU regulatory jurisdictions would likely
create drastically different regulatory schemes and requirements
across the state, leading to inefficiencies and uncertainty for silica
sand mining stakeholders.
On the other hand, a scheme in which the state has sole
regulatory authority over silica sand mining seems more plausible.
As mentioned above, statewide air and water regulatory programs
are the norm, and some states also administer specific mining
oversight programs. The advantages of sole state regulation of silica
50

Id.
Id. (the focus of environmental federalism is usually on whether the federal
government or the states and local governments can best regulate a specific
industry or environmental issue).
52
Id. at 935.
53
See infra Part IV for a more in-depth discussion of the current silica sand
regulatory frameworks in Minnesota and Wisconsin.
51
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sand mining would likely include promoting uniform requirements
and streamlining regulatory processes.54 However, complete state
control with no LGU involvement could lead to regulatory gaps
regarding locale-specific circumstances.55 LGUs are in a better
position to understand and protect the unique local resources that
they deem valuable, rather than state regulators, who do not have as
strong of an incentive as LGUs to ensure that all risks of silica sand
mining are mitigated.56
In addition, an exclusively state-led silica sand mining
regulatory scheme would require a large administrative body with
numerous personnel in order to provide effective oversight across
the entire state and of all the various technical aspects involved in

54

See Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential,
State and Local Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 15-16 (2004). The authors argue that layered state and local resource
extraction regulations may overlap and create actual or seeming conflicts of law,
creating confusion for the developer as to what requirements must be followed.
This often results in the developer making duplicative regulatory efforts or
spending additional resources to solve the legal confusion.
55
Cf. Powers, supra note 12, at 935. In the context of environmental regulation
of the fracking industry, Powers argues that “geographic correlation between
problems and regulatory authorities should guide any attempts to regulate.”
Powers continues, “[a] corollary of this argument is that one-size-fits-all federal
regulations are ineffective due to highly disparate ecological and social
conditions across the states.” Id. This argument is also convincing when applied
to the state-LGU relationship regarding silica sand mining, in which one-sized
state oversight programs may not be responsive enough to address the variety of
interests of LGUs across the state.
56
Cf. Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 16-17. The authors argue that state and
local governmental interests often diverge regarding regulation of energy
resource extractive industries. “States are interested in uniform statewide natural
resource regulation that will satisfy its citizens' need for clean and efficient
energy sources. On the other hand, local governments are interested in preserving
communities not burdened by the environmental and aesthetic social costs of
resource extractive operations.” This state-local tension dynamic appears
analogous to the state’s interest in facilitating the larger economic benefits of
silica sand mining across the state, versus LGU interests in protecting the quality
of life in its region.
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mining.57 It is unlikely that such a large and comprehensive state
agency structure would be flexible enough to adequately address all
the site-specific issues involved in silica sand mining operations.58
Whereas, a decentralized regulatory framework, that includes state
and local roles, offers a more workable and responsive structure
including personnel closer to and more involved in mining activity
oversight. Thus, it appears that a strict matching regulatory
approach, whether led by the state or LGUs, is not a good fit for
silica sand mining.
A more recent regulatory theory proposed to best address
complex environmental problems is “adaptive federalism,” because
it involves “flexible roles for the three levels of government, based
on the observation that overlapping jurisdiction provides a system
of vertical checks and balances.”59 Due to its dynamic and
57

For example, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR)
implements a state-wide nonmetallic mine site reclamation program in
conjunction with the counties. The WDNR oversees the individual county
reclamation programs and the counties are the direct regulators of mine site
reclamation in their jurisdictions. If the WDNR were responsible for direct
oversight of all mine site reclamation across the state, it would need to expand
greatly to fill the roles currently in place in each county. See Nonmetallic Mining
Overview, WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Mines/
Nonmetallic.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) [hereinafter WDNR Nonmetallic
Mining Overview].
58
Id. The WDNR state-county nonmetallic mine reclamation program again
serves as a useful illustration. If only the WDNR oversaw mine reclamation
across the state, it would need personnel with expertise about the various
geographic regions in Wisconsin (i.e., bluff and river valley lands, central plains,
and woodlands) and knowledge about the specific characteristics of the locality
surrounding the mine site, in addition to the ability to expeditiously inspect each
mine site when necessary. It seems unlikely that a single state agency would
have all of these capabilities and execute them efficiently to properly oversee
numerous mine sites across the state, because it would require a large network of
uniquely trained personnel. But rather, the more effective and efficient approach
would be to task the LGUs across the state with oversight roles that require
knowledge of and access to local site conditions.
59
Powers, supra note 12, at 916. The local nature of silica sand mining does not
require strong direct federal oversight, so this discussion will primarily assess the
adaptive approach regarding the state-local environmental regulatory
relationship. Interestingly, Minnesota and Wisconsin are both home charter
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overlapping nature—which is compared to an “ecologic” system—
the adaptive approach is more likely to create comprehensive
regulation, filling gaps that may be left under a strict matching
approach.60 However, the multiple layers of oversight are also more
likely to create over-regulation and inefficiencies, due to potentially
redundant requirements and the complexity of navigating multiple
regulatory channels.61
The “regulatory commons” theory should also be considered
when applying a regulatory scheme with overlapping jurisdictions,
such as the adaptive approach. The regulatory commons theory
identifies the potential for gaps in protection that arise due to
“confusion over jurisdictional boundaries . . . even where an
apparently vigorous overlapping regulatory scheme is in place.”62
Thus, other scholars have suggested that combining an adaptive
approach with regulatory commons considerations can create a
robust and self-checking regulatory framework that provides
appropriate oversight for complex environmental issues.63
It appears that an adaptive approach that layers state and
local regulatory control could also apply well to silica sand mining.
Under this approach, the state sets uniform baseline regulations to
protect the land, air, and water resources, promoting the general
welfare of the state. Uniform state environmental regulations not
only ensure that at least minimum protective measures are in place
at each silica sand site, but also foster regulatory certainty for silica
mining industry stakeholders, which increases wider industry
economic efficiency. A truly adaptive scheme should also allow

states, in which the state constitutions provide LGUs broad authority to regulate
in furtherance of the general welfare within their jurisdictions. The state-LGU
power dynamic in home charter states is analogous to the traditional framework
of United States federalism, and home charter states have localized “federalism”
debates regarding power relationships between the state and LGUs.
60
Id. at 936-37.
61
See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 40 (arguing that environmental
regulation of resource extraction industries is becoming increasingly local, yet
state regulation still exists, leading to increased likelihood of over-regulation).
62
Powers, supra note 12, at 916-17.
63
Id. at 917.
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LGUs to set silica sand regulations in addition to or more stringent
than the state, to protect the general welfare concerns specific to
that LGU. For example, a LGU may have a strong interest in taking
special precautions regarding industrial activities near trout streams
or sensitive groundwater resources, which are valuable recreational,
economic, and public health resources that the community depends
on. Yet, LGU regulations must not frustrate the purpose of the
state’s regulatory framework and should be contained within a
reasonable scope so as to not create widely inconsistent
requirements among the various LGUs.
However, to maximize regulatory effectiveness and
efficiency over silica sand mining, the regulatory approach should
go beyond a basic state-local dual authority scheme. A cooperative
framework that integrates state and LGU regulators would create an
even more adaptive and responsive system.64 The state and LGUs
can provide support for each other in ways that address each entities
regulatory strengths and weaknesses: the state can lend its adept
technical expertise to LGUs, and LGUs can provide a network of
local knowledge and proximity to mining sites.65 With the state and
LGUs working as partner regulators, problems with redundant and
excessive requirements would be less likely, because the state and
LGU programs could be more closely integrated, rather than
separately layered.66 In addition, a state-LGU cooperative
relationship would be more likely to prevent gaps that arise in the
regulatory commons context, as the state and LGUs would have
further refined regulatory roles and knowledge of each other’s
programs, limiting confusion over jurisdictional authority.67
64

Id. at 953-54. The author argues that a regulatory regime that includes
“responsive interaction” among multiple levels of government can give “states
and localities a better chance to formulate policies aligned with their resources
and expertise, leading to increased political accountability, jurisdictional
confidence, and fewer regulatory commons problems.”
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 937. “[D]espite the potential for jurisdictional confusion that
overlapping vertical jurisdiction presents, one can conclude that regulatory
commons problems are more likely to be prevented by clarifying roles and
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The state-local cooperative approach to regulate silica sand
mining may sound ideal in theory, but in reality there would no
doubt be tension over power between the state and LGUs
throughout the regulatory framework.68 A system of overlapping
authority will inevitably lead to preemption battles, and when it
does, state-local law preemption rules would resolve the conflict.69
In general, state regulation would trump LGU regulation over silica
sand mining in circumstances when there is direct conflict between
the rules or if the local law impedes the state’s ability to achieve its
regulatory objectives. Field preemption issues should not arise,
because as discussed above, a regulatory scheme in which the state
occupies the entire field is not appropriate given the primarily local
environmental impacts of silica sand mining.70
Developing a silica sand regulatory scheme through the
cooperative approach would limit conflicts between state and local
rules, because the state and LGUs would work together to develop
clearly defined oversight roles and programs. However, if state law
preempts local authority to regulate a public health or
environmental issue, the state must provide adequate oversight to
replace the limit on LGU action. A state law is unreasonable and
against public policy if it preempts local law and results in underprotection that the LGU could have otherwise addressed through
supplemental regulation.71
granting a variety of regulators increased responsibility for problems than by
contracting jurisdiction and reducing available resources.”
68
See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 12-15. There are many opportunities
for conflict between state and local regulators who have concurrent authority over
mining operations, as the state seeks to apply uniform standards while the LGUs
assert power to regulate within their jurisdiction as they see fit.
69
Id. at 14-15 (“There are three basic ways a state statute can preempt a county
ordinance or regulation: (1) by express statutory language; (2) by inferring state
intent to completely occupy the field; or (3) by operational conflict, where partial
preemption may occur if the effect of local law would conflict with the
application of an applicable state statute.”).
70
See supra Part II.B.
71
Cf. Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 12, at 535. The authors highlight
examples of state legislatures preempting LGU authority to regulate
environmental risks associated with fracking, yet the states do not provide
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Even if some form of replacement oversight is provided by
the state to address the LGUs concerns, a bar on LGU authority and
involvement regarding the more local aspects of silica sand mining
is not the proper approach. A LGU regulator is empowered by a
local legislative body that is closer, both physically and interestbased, to the residents of a community.72 Therefore, the LGU
regulator should be responsive to specific needs of the community,
as well as accountable for its oversight actions.73 On the other hand,
state regulators and the state legislature are further removed from
the local communities, rendering state law less likely to meet the
site-specific oversight needs of communities where the silica sand
mining is occurring. In addition, there seems to be a fundamental
problem in removing regulatory authority from the LGUs regarding
land use issues that primarily affect the people within its
jurisdiction. Limiting LGU authority to oversee silica sand
operations impedes on its ability to promote the general welfare of
its community.

additional oversight to address the concerns of communities where the oil and gas
extraction is occurring. The authors deem this method of legislative action to bar
local supplemental regulation as contrary to public policy.
72
See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 13-14. The authors argue that modern
growth of the environmental ethic and increased citizen involvement are leading
to increased assertion of local control over resource extractive activities, as
“[l]ocal governments and their regulatory agencies seek to represent the interests
of their constituents.”
73
Cf. Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 12, at 535. In the context of fracking
regulation, the authors argue that it is the proper role of local government to
ensure adequate health and environmental protection for the community
surrounding the fracking well, whereas the state has the proper role of regulating
the on-site drilling and production process. This concept of proper LGU
responsiveness and accountability for regulating the potential impacts of fracking
applies equally well to the risks that silica sand mining pose for the surrounding
community.
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IV. SILICA SAND MINING REGULATORY
FRAMEWORKS IN MINNESOTA AND
WISCONSIN
A. Federal Regulatory Involvement
Silica sand mining activities are subject to a number of
federal environmental protection statutes, such as the Clean Air
Act, Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and the
Endangered and Threatened Species Act.74 The states, including
Minnesota and Wisconsin, administer most of the federal
environmental requirements that stem from these laws as part of
their state regulatory programs.75 Yet, there are exceptions in
which federal agencies actively regulate jointly with the states, such
as wetlands oversight in Wisconsin by the WDNR and U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers.76 As another example, the federal Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA) works cooperatively with the
states to develop and implement on-site mine safety and health
programs to protect mine workers.77 In addition to jointly regulating
with states, the federal government always has the power to
increase its regulatory presence and pursue its own enforcement
actions regarding federal statutes.78
The current regulatory structure in which Minnesota and
Wisconsin state agencies act as the primary regulators to implement
federal rules applicable to silica sand mining appears to be the best
arrangement. A framework in which the states administer broad
land, air, and water protection programs, requiring mining facilities
to meet state and federal permitting rules, has been in place and
proven successful for decades in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Many
74

Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40.
See Powers, supra note 12, at 930-31.
76
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40.
77
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40; See also MSHA’s
Statutory Functions, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,http://www.msha.gov/
MSHAINFO/MSHAINF1.HTM#.Uz7RPcetonI (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
78
See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40.
75
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more sand mining sites are being developed in Minnesota and
Wisconsin in recent years, which may create a greater burden on
state regulators. However, it appears that the state agencies can
continue to provide effective oversight without federal involvement,
as long as the states can keep up with processing and enforcing the
stream of mining environmental permits. The fact that silica sand
mining is growing rapidly in relatively few areas around the country
and the associated environmental issues are local in nature also
indicates that a limited federal regulatory role seems most
appropriate.
B. Minnesota’s Regulatory Framework
1. The Current Approach and Legislative
Activity
In Minnesota, the state and LGUs each have varying degrees
of regulatory power to oversee silica sand mining sites. LGUs have
broad authority to plan and site general land use activities,
including mining, within their jurisdiction through zoning
ordinances.79 Additionally, LGUs can regulate more specific on-site
activities with further ordinances focused on facility operations,
safety requirements, and environmental standards.80 However, as
silica sand mining activity increased, many LGUs did not have
specific ordinances to regulate mining activities or the technical
resources to create and implement effective sand mining oversight

79

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (West 2014).
Minnesota LGUs are granted this power through state statutory authority to
regulate for the general welfare or through home rule charter (local constitution)
general welfare clauses. However, LGUs cannot regulate contrary to state law or
the Minnesota Constitution. See generally Deborah Dyson, State-local Relations,
RESEARCH DEP’T. OF THE MINN. HOUSE OF REP’S (Oct. 2010),
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/sslcstrel.pdf; MINN. CONST. art.
XII, § 4; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 412.221 (West 2013).

80
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measures.81 LGUs may implement moratoriums to temporarily
prohibit silica sand mining activities while the LGU develops
regulations to address mining operations.82 Moreover, if a LGU
articulates important public interest justifications, it may completely
exclude new silica sand mining sites from the jurisdiction through
ordinance.83
At the state level, the Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources (MDNR) and Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(MPCA) regulate various aspects of sand and gravel mining
operations through issuing water, air, and wetland impact permits.84
Silica sand mining operations are categorized as a nonmetallic
mining industrial activity, and must follow general permit
requirements associated with this regulatory category.85 Yet until
recently there were few state rules that focused directly on potential
81

See Tosto, supra note 3 (discussing Minnesota counties and cities that enacted
moratoriums and new ordinances to address rapidly growing silica sand mining
development).
82
For example, the City of Winona, Minnesota adopted a year-long moratorium
on silica sand operations that was in place through March of 2013.During the
moratorium, the city conducted a study and ultimately adopted new ordinances to
address health and environmental concerns associated with existing and future
silica sand operations. New requirements were created for moisture testing,
fugitive dust control plans, and facility setback from residences, in addition to
expanding other conditional use permit zoning requirements for silica sand
facilities.
See
Frac
Sand
Information,
CITY
OF
WINONA,
http://www.cityofwinona.com/city-services/planning-zoning/frac-sandinformation/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
83
See, e.g., Elizabeth Bundar, Houston County Could Permanently Ban New
Frac Sand Mining, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.
mprnews.org/story/2014/01/30/houston-county-frac-sand-mining-ban. Houston
County is considering enacting a ban on new silica sand mining operations based
on concerns that increased truck traffic from mining activities would overwhelm
the county’s infrastructure and the potential environmental impacts on trout
streams and other natural features that are critical to the region.
84
See MPCA Silica Sand Mining, supra note 25.
85
See Nonmetallic Mining and Associated Activities: Permit MNG490000,
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.pca.state.
mn.us/index.php/water/water-permits-and-rules/water-permits-andforms/nonmetallic-mining-and-associated-activities.html.
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off-site health and environmental impacts that are specific to silica
sand operations, such as fugitive silica dust emissions.86 In response
to vocal public concern about the many new silica sand sites
popping up around the state, the 2013 Minnesota Legislature passed
new laws to specifically address several health and environmental
issues associated with silica sand mining.87
The 2013 laws direct multiple state agencies to develop
regulations regarding various aspects of silica sand mining and to
provide LGUs with technical assistance for implementing local
regulation.88 Importantly, the 2013 laws also allow LGUs to extend
for one year an interim ordinance or renew an expired ordinance
prohibiting new or expanded silica sand projects.89 This moratorium
extension authority gives LGUs additional time to develop their
own silica sand oversight measures, and take advantage of state
technical assistance in doing so, before silica sand sites become
established in their communities that currently have
underdeveloped sand mining regulatory tools.
There are a number of provisions in the 2013 silica sand
laws that direct state agencies to act to facilitate LGU regulation,
with the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board (EQB) positioned
as the central body in assisting LGUs to regulate at the local level.90
By December 2013, the EQB developed a draft version of in-depth
model standards to aid LGUs in creating individual local silica sand
86

See MDH Health Based Guidance - Crystalline Silica, MINN. DEP’T OF
HEALTH (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/eh/hazardous/
topics/silica/silicaguidance.html.
87
See State of Minnesota Silica Sand Information, MINN. ENVTL. QUALITY BD.,
http://silicasand.mn.gov/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). The package of new silica
sand laws that were enacted in the 2013 Minnesota legislative session are referred
to as the “2013 laws” throughout this article. This website was created following
adoption of the 2013 laws as a one-stop portal to access silica sand mining
regulatory information from various state agencies.
88
Id.
89
2013 Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 4, § 106.
90
The EQB is comprised of the Governor’s Office, five citizens, and nine state
agency leaders to develop policy, long-term planning, and review significant
project proposals affecting Minnesota’s environment. See MINN. ENVTL.
QUALITY BD., http://www.eqb.state.mn.us/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
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mining ordinances.91 The EQB is also tasked to assemble a silica
sand technical assistance team to help LGUs regarding a wide range
of regulatory matters upon request.92 In addition, the EQB has
created and must maintain an online library of local silica sand
mining ordinances and permits as a resource for all stakeholders.93
Several provisions of the 2013 silica sand laws require
various state agencies to adopt new rules regarding silica sand
mining aspects of particular concern to health and the environment.
The law directs the MPCA to develop rules for the control of
particulate emissions in air from silica sand projects.94 The MDNR
is required to adopt rules pertaining to the reclamation of silica sand
mines.95 The EQB must implement new heightened environmental
review requirements for proposed mines.96 The Minnesota
Department of Health (MDH) was required to adopt an air quality
health-based value for respirable crystalline silica by January
2014—the MDH released its health-based value in July 2013.97
Minnesota state agencies have been actively engaging LGUs
and the public for input during the new silica sand regulation and
rule-making process. The EQB, MPCA, and MDNR are in the
process of creating a joint advisory committee, including
representation from LGUs, the silica sand industry, and concerned
citizens, to provide comments to the agencies throughout

91

DRAFT Tools to Assist Local Governments in Planning for and Regulating
Silica Sand Projects, MINN. ENVTL. QUALITY BD. (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.
eqb.state.mn.us/documents/Tools%20for%20Local%20Govt%20draft%20DECE
MBER%2013_2013.pdf; see MINN. STAT. § 116C.99 (2013).
92
MINN. STAT. § 116C.99 (2013).
93
Id. at § 116C.992; Library of Local Government Ordinances and Permits
Regulating
Silica
Sand,
MINN.
ENVTL.
QUALITY
BD.,
http://www.eqb.state.mn.us/silicaLibrary.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
94
2013 Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 4, § 105.
95
Id.
96
Id.; MINN. STAT. § 116C.991 (2013).
97
See MDH Health Based Guidance - Crystalline Silica, supra note 86; 2013
Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 4, § 105
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development of the new silica sand rules.98 Prior to proposing any
new silica sand rules, the MPCA provided a broad initial request for
public comments in order to get early and extensive public input
and to allow for potential inclusion of water pollution standards
related to silica sand projects, going beyond the requirements
mandated in the 2013 laws.99
2. Assessing Minnesota’s Regulatory
Framework
Minnesota’s state-local regulatory scheme for silica sand
mining is an adaptive framework that is evolving toward a more
cooperative regulatory approach. The Minnesota scheme is adaptive
because it layers state and local regulators, allowing each level of
government proper authority to oversee activities that it can
regulate most effectively.100 The state gives Minnesota LGUs
substantial power to regulate land use in their jurisdictions for the
98

See Soliciting Applicants for Joint Silica Sand Advisory Committee, MINN.
ENVTL.
QUALITY
B D.
(Nov.
14,
2013),
http://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/MNEQB/bulletins/94e0ac.
99
See Request for Comments on Planned Amendments to Rule Pertaining to the
Control of Particulate Emissions and other Pollutants from Silica Sand Projects,
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Jul. 10, 2013), http://www.pca.state.
mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=19801.
100
The LGUs are best suited to site and oversee the mining activities in their
jurisdiction, because LGUs are on the ground and have more intimate knowledge
of what is happening in the community. See Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 12,
at 535 (arguing that it is the proper role for LGUs to protect the “health and
safety of the community through the use of comprehensive planning and zoning
tailored to the unique needs of each community”). Whereas the state agencies are
better equipped to create the technical regulations required to protect against
health and environmental impacts associated with mining activities, because the
state often has more resources and a central team of technical experts can more
efficiently produce general and consistent rules. Cf. Powers, supra note 12, at 967
(arguing that in the context of fracking, an adaptive regulatory approach would
allow state and local regulators to focus on roles within their expertise, such as
the state developing environmental regulations and ensuring compliance with
federal environmental laws and LGUs using their land use and municipal zoning
powers).
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general welfare.101 LGUs can determine if, where, and under what
conditions silica sand mining activities can be performed in their
communities through zoning and other ordinances.102 This allows
LGUs to control burgeoning development of sand mining in the
manner to best promote the specific economic and environmental
interests of their residents. LGUs can choose to be more
accommodating to silica sand development or they can choose to
closely limit or outright exclude sand mining in line with the
community’s economic and land use planning ideals.
Underneath the layer of strong local oversight authority, the
state administers broad environmental regulatory permitting
programs through the EQB, MPCA, and MDNR. State
implemented land, air, and water programs provide a base-level of
consistent standards to be followed by all stakeholders across the
state. Some Minnesota LGUs do not currently have well-developed
regulations to address silica sand mining, so the robust state
environmental programs are critical to provide at least a minimum
level of oversight protection for mining sites and surrounding
communities.
In response to public concern that silica sand mining was
under-regulated in communities across Minnesota, the 2013
legislature swiftly enacted a package of new laws that not only
direct state agencies to create additional rules where gaps existed,
but also direct agencies to assist LGUs in strengthening local
regulation.103 The 2013 laws allow LGUs to extend moratoriums to
provide adequate time to develop well-conceived ordinances to
regulate silica sand mining in their jurisdiction. The release of time
pressure and availability of state technical assistance should allow
101

See supra Part IV.B.1.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
103
For example, the MPCA and MDH created silica dust air emissions
management rules and a health impact standard to specifically address the public
concern of respirable crystalline silica hazards from silica sand mining sites. The
EQB, with LGU input, created a model ordinance for LGUs to use in drafting
their own silica sand regulations and an EQB technical advisory team is available
for LGUs to consult regarding various silica sand regulatory issues. See supra
Part IV.B.1.
102
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LGUs to create effective silica sand oversight programs to properly
protect the community and efficiently process mining site
permits.104
Under the 2013 laws, state agencies are required to work
with and seek LGU input during many of the newly directed
regulatory actions.105 In addition to LGU input, Minnesota state
agencies are also actively involving the public and industry players
on a joint advisory committee that will help guide the agencies
through the new silica sand rule-making process.106 The state is
also taking actions to aid and increase regulatory efficiency for all
stakeholders by maintaining an online LGU silica sand ordinance
and permit library.107
The 2013 laws seem to be stimulating regulatory teamwork
between the state and LGUs over silica sand mining. By working
with the state, LGUs are better able to craft local ordinances that
complement existing state regulator efforts, so the local regulation
can focus on the specific issues that need strengthening in their
jurisdiction and avoid creating redundancies. The State of
Minnesota and LGUs are also seeking input from community and
industry interest groups while developing the new silica sand
regulations in an effort create a regulatory scheme that works for all
stakeholders.108 These examples of teamwork throughout the silica
sand regulatory framework should lead to more effective oversight,
greater budget and time efficiencies, and fewer costly disputes for
regulators, industry, and the public.
104

See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 40. The authors argue that the
increasingly local regulation of mineral extraction activities can lead to
unnecessarily burdensome oversight throughout the duration of the project, if the
LGU “micro-manages” the project without clearly set out standards. Thus, both
the developer and LGU can benefit from “an up-front, one-stop, pre-permitting
system to [provide the developer certainty and consistency regarding the
requirements and] avoid repeated and costly regulatory challenges by the
developer [against the LGU].”
105
See supra Part IV.B.1.
106
See supra Part IV.B.1.
107
See supra Part IV.B.1.
108
See Soliciting Applicants for Joint Silica Sand Advisory Committee, supra
note 90.
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Although there are many positive signs that state and local
regulators are working together in an adaptive regulatory approach
to silica sand mining, there are still greater opportunities for the
state and LGUs to actively cooperate to further improve the overall
regulatory framework. The state and LGUs could integrate aspects
of their regulatory programs or create a hierarchy structure109 to
increase efficiency and reduce costs. Minnesota could adapt a
framework similar to Wisconsin’s state-county mine site
reclamation program110 for its new MPCA silica sand air quality
monitoring program and MDNR nonmetallic mine reclamation
program directed under the 2013 laws. Regulatory programs that
integrate state and local staff, or implement a hierarchy of state and
LGU agency responsibilities, can better utilize the strongest skills
of regulatory personnel and the geographic network currently in
place across the state.111
The EQB has taken an important step to increase shared
electronic data practices between agencies by creating an online
library of LGU silica sand ordinances and permits as a resource for
stakeholders. However, this concept can be taken further to create a
comprehensive regulatory portal that provides all of the applicable
state and local regulations, guidance documents, and permits based
on the specific location and characteristics of the mine site. This
online portal could also provide public information regarding each
mine site across the State, ideally in the form of an interactive map,
for reference by the community and other stakeholders.112
109

For example, state regulators could oversee LGU regulatory programs, and
the LGU regulators would provide the direct oversight for mining activities--like
the WDNR nonmetallic mining reclamation program hierarchy framework. See
WDNR Nonmetallic Mining Overview, supra note 57; see also infra Part IV.C.2
for a more detailed description of the WDNR nonmetallic mining reclamation
program.
110
Id.
111
See supra note 100.
112
The MPCA operates an online mapping application titled “What’s in my
neighborhood?” (WIMN) that provides information about MPCA-regulated sites
such as site characteristics, operating and environmental permits, permit
violations, and environmental monitoring. See What’s in My Neighborhood,
MINN.
POLLUTION
CONTROL
AGENCY
(Jan.
30,
2014),
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C. Wisconsin’s Regulatory Framework
1. The Current Approach and Legislative
Activity
Wisconsin, like Minnesota, is a municipal home rule state.
Thus, Wisconsin LGUs have wide authority to regulate silica sand
mining through various land use activity controls, such as zoning,
site operation, and environmental ordinances.113 However, many
Wisconsin towns have not enacted a zoning ordinance or they must
obtain county board approval in order to change their zoning
ordinance.114 Thus, many Wisconsin towns completely lack the
zoning oversight power, or are under county control, to regulate
mine site and operating conditions within their community.115 But
in a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Zwiefelhofer v.
Town of Cooks Valley, towns were provided greater autonomous
regulatory power over sand mining.116 The court held that a town
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/data/wimn-whats-in-myneighborhood/whats-in-my-neighborhood.htmlWIMN. WIMN is a useful tool,
but it should be expanded, or a new comprehensive silica sand mining mapping
database should be developed to include LGU and other state agency (i.e.,
MDNR) regulatory information. This compilation of silica sand site and
regulatory information would be especially useful within an interactive map
format to aid regulators in assessing cumulative effects of mine sites in a specific
area and to offer more transparency to the public regarding mine site locations
and operations.
113
The Wisconsin Constitution grants municipal home rule authority, which
provides cities and villages the power to determine their local affairs and
government without interference from the state legislature. The municipal home
rule power is only limited by other provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution and
legislative enactments of statewide concern that uniformly affect every city and
village. See Rick Champagne, Municipal Home Rule, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE
BUREAU (Jul. 2004), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/consthi/
04consthiiv3.htm; WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
114
See Jason Stein, Frac Sand Bill Won't be Taken Up Until Spring, Assembly
Speaker Says, JOURNAL SENTINEL (Oct. 22, 2013),,http://www.jsonline.com/
blogs/news/228816481.html.
115
Id.
116
Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 809 N.W.2d 362 (Wis. 2012).
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ordinance regulating nonmetallic mining was validly enacted under
its police power, and the town’s mining ordinance did not require
county board approval because it was not a zoning ordinance.117
In addition to police power oversight authority, towns and
counties may implement moratoriums to temporarily prohibit silica
sand mining activities.118 LGUs may also enact complete bans on
new mining operations within their jurisdiction if it reasonably
promotes the general welfare.119 However, Wisconsin recently
passed a law that puts in place heightened requirements for LGUs
to enact moratoriums, such as obtaining a written report from a
certified engineer or health professional to document that a
moratorium is essential in addressing public safety concerns.120
In contrast to the generally broad LGU regulatory power in
Wisconsin, there is a bill currently moving through the Wisconsin
Legislature, Senate Bill (SB) 349, that seeks to significantly limit
both LGU and state regulatory power over silica sand mining.121 SB
117

Id. at 378-79.
For example in September 2013, Trempealeau County enacted a one-year
moratorium on new or expansion of silica sand mines to allow county supervisors
to study potential health impacts of silica sand mining. See Richard Kremer,
Company Skirts Trempealeau County Frac Sand Mining Ban, WIS. PUB. RADIO
(Nov. 5, 2013, 4:06 PM), http://www.wpr.org/company-skirts-trempealeaucounty-frac-sand-mining-ban.
119
See, e.g., PEPIN CNTY., WIS. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 28 (2013),
http://newords.municode.com/readordinance.aspx?ordinanceid=598774&datasou
rce=ordbank. In June 2013, Pepin County enacted an ordinance that prohibited
silica sand mining in a designated area along the Mississippi River in order to
protect the region’s character and tourism economy.
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WIS. STAT. § 66.1002 (2013).
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See Steven Verburg, Far-reaching bill stirs conflict over who should—and
can—monitor mining, CHIPPEWA HERALD (Oct. 27, 2013), http://chippewa.
com/dunnconnect/news/local/far-reaching-bill-stirs-conflict-over-who-shouldand-can/article_f9eb34f4-3e64-11e3-a4c8-001a4bcf887a.html (“The sweeping
sand mining bill [SB 349] is in part a response to [the] 2012 [Town of Cooks
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349 limits LGU regulatory authority over sand mining to only
zoning and mine reclamation ordinance powers—removing LGU
authority to oversee many on-site mining activities and associated
environmental impacts.122 The bill also restricts LGU regulation of
non-conforming land uses, protecting mining sites that were legally
operating before the LGU determined that mining was not an
appropriate land use in that area.123 In addition, and likely the most
substantial regulatory limitation, SB 349 prohibits LGUs and state
agencies from promulgating air and water regulations that are more
stringent than the minimum standards set out in current state law,
requiring state legislative action to increase silica sand mining
oversight standards.124
At the state level, the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (WDNR) is the primary state agency that regulates silica
sand mining activities through the WDNR’s nonmetallic mining
program, water program, and air program.125 Due to high interest
from various stakeholders surrounding the rapid expansion of sand
mining in Wisconsin, in January 2012, the WDNR published a
report that assessed the environmental risks associated with silica
sand mining and the regulatory framework in place to manage the
risks.126 The report concluded that Wisconsin’s current state-local
regulatory framework adequately protects against potential impacts
to public health and the environment associated with silica sand
mining.127 No new state laws or WDNR rules have been adopted
that specifically regulate silica sand mining in Wisconsin.
The main focus of the WDNR nonmetallic mining program
is to administer the state-wide mine site reclamation program, in
which the WDNR oversees counties as they implement local
122

S.B. 349, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014).
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See Silica (Frac) Sand Mining, WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES.,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Mines/Silica.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
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Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4.
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The report also stated that “[a]s the number of sand mines and processing
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[WDNR] may consider examining cumulative environmental impacts.” Id. at 41.
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mining reclamation programs that must meet WDNR
requirements.128 Counties that implement local mining reclamation
programs are deemed regulatory authorities (RAs), and the RAs
regulate silica mining operations by issuing reclamation permits
that require conformance to approved reclamation plans.129 Mine
site reclamation plans must include procedures to manage
environmental impacts, properly restore the site following mining,
and bond posting to ensure funding for site reclamation activities
prior to commencing mining.130 Mine sites located in LGUs that
have not implemented a local mine reclamation program are
regulated directly by the WDNR.131 The RAs are the direct
regulators of mine site reclamation, but the WDNR is available to
provide technical assistance to RAs on reclamation issues.132 In
addition, the Nonmetallic Mining Advisory Committee, consisting
of representation from industry, scientific, and community
stakeholders, advises the WDNR on administering the state-wide
nonmetallic mining reclamation program.133
The WDNR regulates potential impacts to surface waters
and groundwater that may result from silica sand operations
through various statutes and WDNR water program
requirements.134 The state also directs counties to regulate potential
water quality impacts to shoreland surface waters through zoning
ordinances, in which there are statutory minimum standards that
LGUs must enforce.135 Many counties have adopted tighter
standards that go beyond the state minimum standards.136
128
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The WDNR regulates potential impacts to air quality that
may result from silica sand operations through various statutes and
WDNR air program requirements.137 The WDNR does not
specifically regulate respirable crystalline silica, which is currently
an air emission contaminant of significant concern to the public.138
However, the WDNR requires silica sand operations to implement a
comprehensive, site specific fugitive dust control plan to eliminate
or reduce all sizes of dust emissions.139 The WDNR also requires
large mining operations (production averaging more than 2,000 tons
per month) to install and operate ambient air monitors to
continuously monitor particulate pollution, in connection with
United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) air
monitoring network requirements.140
2. Assessing Wisconsin’s Regulatory
Framework
Wisconsin’s current silica sand mining regulatory scheme
appears to be an adaptive approach with effective state and local
oversight layers. LGUs have wide authority to regulate mine siting
and on-site operations as needed to protect health, environment, and
the general welfare within their jurisdiction.141 Wisconsin counties
administer mine site reclamation and shoreland protection programs
that must meet state minimum standards; however, the counties can
include additional standards in their site reclamation and shoreland
programs to protect its communities’ unique concerns.142 In
addition, the Zwiefelhofer decision asserted that Wisconsin towns
have separate authority, not limited by county control, to adopt non137
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zoning mining ordinances to further protect the towns’ specific
interests.143
The linked oversight layers of the Wisconsin nonmetallic
mining reclamation program, in which the state oversees county
programs and the counties (and sometimes towns and cities)
oversee the individual mine sites,144 promotes regulatory
effectiveness and efficiency. This hierarchical framework
establishes clear state and local regulator roles to prevent redundant
regulation, matches appropriate regulatory workloads for the state
and LGUs, and prevents oversight gaps with dual regulator layers.
The local county and towns are best suited to implement the
specific reclamation plans and mining ordinances at the mine site
level, due to the LGU’s proximity to and knowledge of land use and
economic goals in its jurisdiction. The WDNR, on the other hand, is
better suited as an administrator of the state-wide reclamation
program, to ensure that the counties are implementing at least
consistent base standards and a proper overall reclamation program.
The WDNR mining reclamation program is characteristic of
an integrated and cooperative regulatory framework for silica sand
mining. The separately operating but connected, state and county
reclamation programs work together to reduce regulatory gaps and
increase efficiency.145 The WDNR provides technical assistance to
counties regarding mine site reclamation issues,146 so the state and
county staff also directly work together to strengthen the local
programs. In addition, the WDNR involves input from industry,
scientific, and community stakeholders through the Nonmetallic
Mining Advisory Committee to guide the reclamation program at
the state level.147
However, the recent Wisconsin legislative activity, which
has restricted LGU moratorium powers148 and seeks to significantly
reduce state and local authority to strengthen nonmetallic mining
143
144
145
146
147
148

Zwiefelhofer, 809 N.W.2d 362.
See supra Part IV.C.1.
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oversight,149 are steps taken in the wrong direction to limit state and
local silica sand regulation. Deference should be given to the LGU
moratorium authority, as a local legislative act, without the need for
LGUs to produce extensive findings to justify the moratorium
decision. This law fundamentally changes the LGU use of
moratoriums as a legislative land-use planning tool. The traditional
purpose of the moratorium is to halt land use activities with poorly
understood consequences, while the LGU assesses the adequacy of
the regulatory scheme to protect against risks associated with the
land use. It is proper to require the LGU to provide rational public
interest reasons for a moratorium, but if LGUs must conduct a
technical study in order to provide enough evidence to support a
moratorium (and such a study might be a high financial burden on
many small towns), the suspect land use and potential for harm
continues while the LGU begins its assessment, negating the
protective purpose of the moratorium.
Removing oversight power from LGUs in combination with
restrictions on the WDNR to prevent additional mining regulations,
as set out in SB 349, is likely to result in under-protection of the
health and environmental risks associated with silica sand mining.
If LGUs do not have authority to regulate certain aspects of mine
site operations, then the state will need to fill in the regulatory gaps.
However, the WDNR is ill equipped to provide local and suitably
responsive oversight at each of the more than one hundred silica
sand mining sites across the state. The WDNR would need to
substantially increase its staff and network to meet the specific
silica sand oversight needs of each LGU, which is unlikely to occur
due to budget issues and the apparent injudiciousness of such an
approach.
SB 349 would change the Wisconsin silica sand regulatory
scheme from the current state-local adaptive cooperative approach
to a scheme with more state regulatory primacy, yet the bill
simultaneously prevents the WDNR from increasing regulatory
standards without a change in state laws. If SB 349 is adopted, it
will likely lead to even stronger public concern and opposition to
149
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silica sand mining, which may have unintended consequences that
undermine the goals of the bill to deregulate and promote silica
sand mining industry expansion.150 Intense public opposition could
lead to more moratoriums and complete bans on silica sand mining
in LGUs across Wisconsin, because once SB 349 removes
substantial LGU authority, the counties and towns are only left with
these more drastic regulatory options.

V. CONCLUSION
The silica sand mining boom in Minnesota and Wisconsin
has aroused much debate over the potential economic benefits and
environmental risks connected with the mining activities. The
debate has largely focused on determining the proper state and local
regulatory controls and overall framework to adequately protect
against health and environmental impacts while also avoiding
undue regulatory burdens that hinder economic development. It
appears that a state primacy regulator approach with limited LGU
involvement is poorly suited to provide efficient regulatory
processing and comprehensive environmental protection for silica
sand mining activities, due to the local geographic nature, yet wide
dispersion of mine sites across the state.151 Instead, an adaptive
regulatory approach that integrates state and local oversight
150

Cf. Powers, supra note 12, at 915 (arguing that New York’s state law primacy
regulatory approach to fracking, in which the federal government has no
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authority and promotes cooperative functioning between the state
and local regulators creates thorough environmental controls and
promotes regulatory efficiency over silica sand mining.152 The
adaptive cooperative scheme combines the responsive capabilities
of LGUs with the technical expertise, uniformity, and
organizational resources of state regulators. This results in a flexible
state-local regulatory framework that better meets the specific needs
of the communities adjacent to the mining activities and streamlines
regulatory actions.
Several aspects of Minnesota and Wisconsin’s silica sand
regulatory frameworks meld to create effective state-local adaptive
approaches in each state, including: broad LGU authority to
regulate land use to promote its communities’ best interests; state
enforcement of base-level uniform environmental standards; state
regulators providing technical assistance to local regulators; statelocal regulator teamwork to strengthen local regulation (Minnesota)
and implement oversight programs (Wisconsin); and state agencies
inviting stakeholder input to guide regulatory changes.153 These
examples of state and local dual-layer authority and teamwork
should create confidence in all stakeholders that silica sand mining
is being properly regulated to protect environmental and economic
interests in Minnesota and Wisconsin.
However, Minnesota and Wisconsin diverge regarding the
nature of recent legislative activity associated with silica sand
mining in each state. In 2013, Minnesota enacted laws that create
additional state oversight programs to address public concerns and
facilitate a more cooperative state-local regulatory approach to
silica sand mining.154 Wisconsin, on the other hand, has recently
legislated heightened burdens on LGUs to control silica sand
mining and a bill is currently under consideration that would
significantly limit local and state authority to regulate sand mining
while also transitioning to a state primacy regulatory scheme.155
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Thus, it seems that Minnesota is taking steps in the right direction
to develop a highly effective state-local regulatory framework that
meets the needs for all stakeholders.156 But Wisconsin is treading
on shaky ground that threatens to erode its strongly adaptive silica
sand regulatory scheme, which may well lead to negative results for
industry, public health, and the environment.157
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